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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
FREEDOM OF SPEECH -
ALL POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR A VERDICT
MUST BE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID*
The greater the importance of safe-guarding the com-
munity from incitements to the overthrow of our insti-
tutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the
need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of
free speech, free press and free assembly in order to
maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes, if desired, may be ob-
tained by peaceful means.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The provisions of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution including the guarantee of freedom of speech are
frequently said to be paramount among constitutional rights.
2
The importance of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
does not, however, stem only from the fact that these rights have
historically been deemed inviolate by the people, but also, more
basic to their importance, from the belief that these freedoms are
vital and indispensable to the maintenance and development of a
free and ordered society.3 Safeguarding these rights so that men
might voice their opinions on matters vital to them and expose
falsehoods through the process of education and discussion is es-
sential to free government.4
Freedom of speech and expression is not an absolute right, and
some limitations are recognized as valid. The spoken word and
other forms of expression are not sacrosanct and may be regu-
*Bachellar v. Maryland, 90 S. Ct. 1312 (1970).
1. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
2. "The indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment
are given a preferred place, and have a sanctity and a sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 16 Am. Jux. 2d Constitutional Law § 333, n. 15 (1964) ; see
also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
3. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion to Whitney v. California,
pointed out "that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy
for evil counsels is good ones." 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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lated as to time, place, and manner of presentation. Limitations
may not be arbitrary, however, and require constitutional justifi-
cation. Such regulation is justified if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of free expression and if the incidefital restriction on the exercise
of the freedom is no greater than is necessary to the furtherance
of that interest.5 Difficulty often arises in resolving these con-
siderations, especially where it is obvious that the government
has a valid interest to protect, but it is not easily determined
whether the restriction on freedom is or is not greater than is
necessary. In such situations the trend has been to resolve the
question in favor of a broad interpretation of the bounds of the
freedom and to curb the governmental limitations.
One indication of this trend has been the willingness of the
Supreme Court to reverse convictions that appear to have valid
constitutional grounds, where the record fails to exclude the pos-
sibility that the verdict rested on invalid grounds as well. Where
a statute is invalid in part or the instructions to the jury are in-
definite as to what elements will support a conviction, the Court
has ruled that, if the record does not reveal whether the convic-
tion rested on valid or invalid grounds, or both, then the convic-
tion cannot stand. BacheZla' v. Maryland is indicative of the fact
that, in order for states to protect their interests effectively, the
record of any conviction secured will have to reveal that a de-
finite state interest was endangered and that the restriction on
constitutional rights was only that which was necessary to pro-
tect the interest.
In Baciellar the petitioners were convicted in Baltimore City
Criminal Court of violating a Maryland statute which prohibits
"acting in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public
peace, upon any public street... in any [Maryland] city .... ,
In an appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the peti-
tioners contended that their right of free speech, expression, peti-
tion, and assembly as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution was violated by
the application of the statute and the refusal of the trial judge to
instruct the jury that it could not convict on the basis of per-
5. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967). Chief Justice Warren
provided a test to determine if conduct may be constitutionally regulated by re-
solving whether or not the governmental interest in doing so may be described
by an adjective such as "compelling," "substantial," "subordinating," "para-
mount," "cogent," or "strong."
6. 90 S. Ct. 1312 (1970).
7. MARYLAND CODE Axx., art. 27, § 123 (1967).
[Vol. 23
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sonal disagreement -with the appellants' expressed views.8 That
court rejected their contentions, and the Court of Appeals of
Maryland denied certiorari.
On appeal the United States Supreme Court first examined the
factual situation that led to the contention by the petitioners that
there had been a violation of their constitutional rights. The
petitioners had been arrested on March 28, 1966, after participat-
ing in an anti-war demonstration that afternoon. The demonstra-
tion consisted of marching in front of a recruiting station, carry-
ing placards with anti-war slogans, distributing leaflets, and en-
gaging persons in the crowd of onlookers in debates. Some of the
demonstrators staged a "sit-in" in the station and were bodily
evicted at closing time by United States marshals and deputized
police officers. (The conduct of the petitions in the station was
not an issue, since the state did not prosecute them for their con-
duct in that place.9) At this point, according to the police lieu-
tenant in charge, the petitioners lay on the sidewalks, blocking
free passage and singing, while surrounded by placard bearers.
The lieutenant testified that he decided to arrest the petitioners
when it became evident that the crowd had become threatening
and unruly and the demonstrators refused to leave after being
ordered to do so three times.10
On this evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury that the
petitioners might be found guilty of violating the statute in
question on alternative grounds. He charged that a guilty ver-
dict might be returned if the jury found either that the petition-
ers had engaged in "the doing or saying or both of that which
offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people
gathered in the same area" or for their "refusal to obey a police-
man's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the
public peace." 1
The Supreme Court then examined whether the petitioners'
protest was constitutionally protected and whether their consti-
tutional rights to free speech and expression were violated by the
statutory interpretation contained in the instructions to the jury.
8. Bachellar v. Maryland, 3 Md. App. 626, 628, 240 A2d 623, 625 (1968).
9. 90 S. Ct. at 1314.
10. Id. at 1315.
11. Both elements of the instruction were based on the Maryland Court of
Appeals' construction of § 123 in Drews v. Maryland, 224 Md. 186, 192, 167 A.2d
341, 343-44 (1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 378 U.S. 547
(1961). reaffirmed on remand, 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64 (1964), appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 381 U.S. 421 (1965).
3
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The Court concluded that the jury could have rested its verdict
on any of several grounds:
[Pletitioners' convictions could constitutionally have
rested on a finding that they sat or lay across a public
sidewalk with the intent of fully blocking passage along
it, or that they refused to obey police commands to stop
obstructing the sidewalk in this manner and move
on .... It is impossible to say, however, that either of
these grounds was the basis for the verdict. On the con-
trary, so far as we can tell, it is equally likely that "the
verdict resulted merely because [petitioners' views about
Viet INam were] themselves offensive to some of their
hearers." Thus, since petitioners' convictions may have
rested on an unconstitutional ground they must be set
aside.12
In considering cases in which an infringement of constitution-
ally protected conduct is alleged, a court must determine whether
the conduct is protected and whether the limitation or regulation
thereof is greater than necessary to further valid state interests.
If part of the conduct is found to be subject to limitation, then
the court must ascertain whether the punishment applied only
to constitutionally prohibitable conduct and ensure that no
punishment was adjudged for the exercise of protected rights.
This comment will examine (1) necessary limitations and reg-
ulations of freedom of speech and expression and the limiting
factors on the regulations themselves and (2) the development of
the requirement that, for a verdict to be constitutionally valid,
all the grounds on which it may have rested must be constitution-
ally permissible.
Ii. LirmTAio-s ON FmmEDo oF SPEEoH
The necessity for safeguarding the right of free speech and ex-
pression has long been recognized, but in almost any exposition
of the benefits and advantages of the freedom, there is a caveat
that free speech is not absolute. At the same time, it is recognized
that the restriction or limitation itself must be carefully scruti-
nized to ensure that it is imposed only to the degree necessary.
[A] function of free speech under our system of gov-
ernment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
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creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and pre-
conceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom
of speech, though not absolute ... is nevertheless pro-
tected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that arises far above public inconve-
nience, annoyance or unrest .... There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the al-
ternative would lead to standardization of ideas either
by legislatures, courts or dominant political or commun-
ity groups.13
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects
freedom of speech and press against abridgement by state legis-
lative or judicial action.14 When statutes touch a constitutionally
protected area, they must be narrowly drawn so that, upon ap-
plication, the degree of abridgement of the right is minimal. To
ensure that a broad stifling of fundamental personal liberties
does not result, the statute must clearly define and allow punish-
ment only for specific conduct which constitutes a clear and pres-
ent danger "to a substantial interest of the state."15 If narrowly
drawn and properly applied, any abridgement of freedom that
results will be justified if the state interest outweighs the individ-
ual's interest in exercising that freedom in the manner prohibited.
"[lit has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed."'' 6
Statutes dealing directly with speech or expressive conduct
have been upheld as constitutional. In Chaplinskli V. New Hamp-
shire,17 a statute 8 dealing exclusively with spoken language was
13. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
14. See Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Henry v. Collins, 380
U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
15. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) ; see also Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
17. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
18. PUBLIc LAWS OF NEW HAmps-mrE, ch. 378, § 2 (1926).
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying words
to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public
place, nor call him by an offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his
lawful business or occupation.
5
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held to be constitutional, because it was "narrowly drawn and
limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the
domain of state power-the use in a public place of words likely
to cause a breach of the peace."' 9 The Court cited Schenc 'v.
United States20 as authority for the proposition that the right of
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all cir-
cumstances. The Court stated further:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problems. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those by which their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
21
In Feiner v. New York,22 the appellant contended that he was
arrested merely because his views were unpopular and had ex-
cited his listeners. The Court, in rejecting this contention, stated
that it was "well aware that the ordinary murmurings and ob-
jections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a
speaker," but, "when the speaker passes the bounds of argument
or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot," it is within the
authority of the police to prevent a breach of the peace. 23 In up-
holding the statute2 4 under which Feiner was convicted, the
Court quoted GantweNl v. Connecticut20 : "When clear and pres-
ent danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace,
or order appears, the power of the state to punish is obvious."20
In Cox v. Louisiana27 the Court noted that there was a gov-
ernmental responsibility to ensure order and cited control of traf-
fic on the streets as an example; the Court stated that in relation
to that interest the state could restrict the "exercise of some civil
19. 315 U.S. at 573.
20. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
22. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
23. Id. at 320.
24. PNAL LAw OF NEw YORx, § 722 (1909) (as existed immediately prior to
Sept. 1, 1961; see NEw Yomx CODE ANN., Bk. 39, Appendix).
25. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951), quoling from Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
27. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
[Vol. 23
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right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protec-
tion .... 52s
Thus, the Court in BacheZlar did not have to inquire exten-
sively to ascertain that statutes similar to the one under which
the petitioners were convicted have been held to be valid, that a
defendant could be convicted for the reaction provoked in by-
standers by his words or expressive conduct, and that one could
be convicted for the obstruction of free passage of the public.
Having examined these considerations, the court considered
whether, if the petitioners had committed an offense under the
statute, the verdict rested on that part of their conduct that was
constitutionally punishable or upon conduct which was constitu-
tionally protected.
EII. Tnm CONsTirTmoNAILY VALID VimlcT
The Court in Bacheflar found that the anti-war slogans and
phrases on the placards carried by the demonstrators did not fall
into the class of "fighting words" that would justify their punish-
ment.29 Nor could the petitioners be punished because of the un-
easiness and excitement created in the crowd. The petitioners
were not seeking to incite the crowd, and any agitation resulted
from the fact that the petitioners' anti-war views were controver-
sial. In support of this ruling, the Court quoted Street V. New
York: "It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the pub-
lic expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. 3
The Court observed, however, that in light of the instructions
given by the trial judge, the verdict could have rested on any of
a number of grounds. It could have rested on the petitioners' re-
fusal to move on when ordered to do so by a police officer, on the
petitioners' deliberate obstruction of the sidewalk, or, equally as
likely, on the ground that their protest amounted to "the doing
or saying... of that which offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to
incite a number of people gathered in the same area.131 Thus, the
Court found that the petitioners may have been found guilty of
28. Id. at 554-55. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 227 (1963);
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
29. 90 S. Ct. at 1314.
30. Id., quoting from Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See
also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
31. 90 S. Ct. at 1315; see note 11 stpra.
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violating the statute simply because they advocated unpopular
ideas.82
The Bachellar Court cited Stromberg v. California3 as con-
trolling authority. There the appellant had been convicted of
displaying a red flag which was prohibited by a state statute if
done for any of three purposes.34 The Court held that that part
of the statute which stated that it was an offense to display the
flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government was un-
constitutional. Even though the other two grounds were separ-
able and constitutional, the Court reversed because the verdict
did not specify the ground for conviction:
If any of these clauses which the state court has held
to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined
upon this record that the appellant was not convicted
under that clause .... [T]he necessary conclusion from
the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that,
if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the
Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.3 5
There are several cases which follow this pattern of the Court's
investigating the record to determine if any grounds of a verdict
were unconstitutional. The inquiry does not end if the verdict
can be supported on alternative grounds that are constitutional.
A clear example of this pattern is found in Williams v. North
Carolina3 6 where two alternative grounds were submitted to the
jury on which to base its verdict, one of which was constitution-
ally invalid.37 The Court, reversing, stated that to uphold a gen-
eral verdict when it could not be determined whether the jury
rested its verdict on valid or invalid grounds "would be to
32. 90 S. Ct. at 1315.
33. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
34. CALIFCRNIA PENAL CODE, § 403-A (repealed 1933) provided: "Any per-
son who displays a red flag, banner, or badge or any flag, badge, banner or de-
vice of any color or form whatever in any public place or in any meeting place
or public assembly, or from or on any house, building or window as a sign, sym-
bol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or
stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious
character is guilty of a felony."
35. 283 U.S. at 368.
36. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
37. Id. at 290-92. The jury was charged that it could find the defendants
guilty of bigamy if they found that the prior divorce obtained by Williams was
invalid because of the lack of jurisdiction of the Nevada court. The jury was
charged that the Nevada decree should be denied recognition if it found either
that Nevada was not the state of matrimonial domicil or that the North Caro-
lina defendants were not personally served with process in Nevada and made no
appearance. The Supreme Court ruled that the former alternative vras invalid
under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
[Vol. 2,3
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countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment
of constitutional rights."
38
This approach is further illustrated in Terminiello V. Chicago80
where the defendant was convicted by a jury instructed to convict
if it found that his speech either stirred the public to anger or
constituted "fighting words." The Court noted that of the two
grounds one could be constitutionally prohibited but the other
was constitutionally protected. The Court reversed and held that
Terminiello could have been "convicted under the parts of the
ordinance [as construed] which, for example, make it an offense
merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of un-
rest."4
0
In considering whether the trial court's instructions were suf-
ficiently clear as to warrant a definite inference that the jury had
based its verdict on constitutional grounds, the Court in Yates V.
United StateS41 ruled that the verdict should "be set aside in cases
where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on an-
other, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury se-
lected."4 2 This rule is well-established in substance as evidenced
by the cases in which the question has been a consideration. The
Bachellar Court followed the rule in overturning the conviction
of the petitioners.
The Supreme Court in its avidity to prevent any inroads into
freedom of speech has carried the rule even further by examin-
ing not only alternative independent grounds for conviction, but
also the possibility that a contributing factor of one of the
grounds was constitutionally invalid. In Street v. New York 43
the appellant had been convicted of publicly burning a United
States flag in violation of a New York statute which made it a
crime to "publicly defy... or cast contempt upon [an American
flag] either by words or act .... 1,44 The Court held that the stat-
ute was unconstitutionally applied, because "it permitted him to
be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words
a b o u t the American flag."45 The Court, citing Thomas v.
Coflins,46 stated:
38. Id. at 292.
39. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
40. Id. at 5.
41. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
42. Id. at 311.
43. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
44. N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 1425, Subd. 16, par. d (1909).
45. 394 U.S. at 581.
46. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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[E]ven assuming that the record precludes the infer-
ence that appellant's conviction might have been based
soleZy on his words, we are still bound to reverse if the
conviction could have been based upon both his words
and his act.
47
The Street Court noted further that the verdict was general
and the sentence a single penalty and that, unless the record ne-
gated the possibility that the conviction was based on both viola-
tions-burning a flag and speaking contemptuous words about
the flag-it was dictated by Thomas that "the judgment... must
be affirmed as to both or as to neither.148 The Court interpreted
the rationale of Thomas to be:
[Wihen a single count indictment or information
charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the de-
fendant's having done both a constitutionally protected
act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty ver-
dict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable
danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two
acts as "intertwined" and have rested the conviction on
both together.
49
The Court stated further that, since Street could not constitution-
ally be punished for his speech, his conviction could not stand be-
cause the record did not preclude that he was so punished. 0
Evidencing a higher regard for the protection of pure speech,
the Street Court was so concerned that an unconstitutional
abridgement of the freedom of speech might occur that it cen-
tered its consideration of the case around the possible punishment
of the appellant for his spoken words. The Court could have
examined an alternative consideration-whether the state has
power to prevent flag-burning as a form of symbolic conduct-
and the issue would have remained a question of the extent of
first amendment freedom of speech and expression. Chief Jus-
tice Warren, taking issue with the majority in his dissent, stated
that he believed the question of the case to have been the consti-
tutionality of flag-desecration statutes. He noted that the trial
court and both parties stated the question to be "whether the de-
liberate act of burning an American flag in public as a 'protest'
47. 394 U.S. at 587 (Court's emphasis).
48. 394 U.S. at 588, quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529
(1945).
49. 394 U.S. at 588. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945).
50. 394 U.S. at 594.
[Vol. 24
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may be punished as a crime."5' He stated further that the trial
proceedings demonstrated that the words of the appellant were
brought into evidence only to show the appellant's purpose in
burning the flag and that he had not burned it in a manner pre-
scribed by law.
Street is a good example of the inclination of the Supreme
Court to look into any possibility of a verdict resting on uncon-
stitutional grounds and not to affirm a conviction merely be-
cause valid grounds were present on which the verdict could have
been based. The Court was presented with one constitutional
question, but it examined instead the question whether the ap-
pellant had been convicted for his words. The Court then warned
that, if the spoken words of a defendant are introduced into evi-
dence, the verdict must specifically rest on grounds other than
what the defendant had said. Justice Black felt that this was a
diversion from the rule established in Giboney v. Empire lee &
Storage oo.52 where the Court rejected the contention that "the
constitutional freedom of speech and press extends its immunity
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in viola-
tion of a criminal statute.153 The willingness of the Court to di-
vert from the rule in order to preclude the possibility of an un-
constitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and expression
exemplifies the trend set forth in this comment.
IV. CoNCLsIO
An abridgement of freedom of speech and expression will be
upheld as constitutional if (1) it is narrow and specific and pro-
tects a substantial interest of the state; and (2) the interest of
the state when balanced against the individual's interest in exer-
cising the freedom is found to be paramount. Once a defense at-
torney has determined by this test that one or more of the grounds
upon which a possible conviction may rest would constitute an
unjustifiable abridgement of his client's right of expression, he
should request instructions that would require the jury to return
a verdict of innocent unless it found that a conviction could be
based on the valid grounds alone. It is the duty of the court not
only to grant such instructions when requested, but also to make
the determination and give the proper instructions on its own
initiative. By so doing, the court will obviate any possibility that
51. Id. at 595 (Warren, Ch. J., dissenting opinion). See People v. Street, 20
N.Y.2d 231, 234, 229 N.E2d 187, 189 (1967).
52. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
53. 394 U.S. at 610, quoting fr on Giboney v. Empire Ice and Storage Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
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the verdict is based on constitutionally invalid grounds. A court,
in applying a statute, must be especially cautious in its instruc-
tions to the jury in order not to broaden the abridgement of a
constitutional right and thereby render a conviction invalid.
In examining the validity of a conviction, the Supreme Court
of the United States does not merely inquire whether there is any
constitutional basis for the conviction, but examines the record
to ascertain that the verdict does not rest on any unconstitutional
grounds. Baohe"lar is illustrative of the trend of the Court to
overturn a conviction which rested on alternative grounds if any
were invalid under the Constitution. The trend is so firm that
the Court will overturn a conviction for constitutionally prohi-
bitable conduct if the record does not clearly preclude the pos-
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